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Abstract 
 
During the last two decades, law as a factor in European integration has attracted great scientific interest. 
Numerous  studies  and  theoretical  analyses  have  been  published  which  have  undertaken  the  task  of 
examining and explaining the role of law in the progress of integration. The European Court of Justice 
(ECJ)  in  particular,  as  Europe’s  judiciary  body,  draws  much  attention  in  this  context.  However,  the 
inflexible, mechanistic and universalistic notion of rationality that these works employ leads to serious 
misinterpretations and unjustified criticism regarding the role the ECJ takes in the course of integration. 
Within the frameworks of contemporary approaches the Court is perceived as just one more political 
player among other actors and institutions able to shape the EU in the pursuit of its own rational interests. 
By outlining the theoretical concept of context rationality, this article shows that the logics of law and 
judicial law making are based on a non-trivial and non-political rationality and cannot be understood 
appropriately without paying attention to the context of European law.   
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1.  Introduction 
Today,  something  remarkable  and  almost  paradoxical  shows  up  in  the  debates  about 
integration through law and the European Court of Justice (ECJ): of all the different approaches 
and analyses offered by political science, none draws much attention to the law itself – as an 
independent context of legal reasoning and action. Law is just perceived as a variable that is 
dependent  upon  the  actors’  interests  and  their  shortsighted  wills  to  proceed  in  the  course  of 
integration.  It  is  viewed  from  the  exterior,  as  a  mere  tool  of  integration,  while  the  interior 
processes, i.e. the rules of law, are not considered significant. Put another way, integration theory 
today treats the law as a black box: an object that has a shape, but an unknowable content. 
Accordingly,  research  in  political  science  has  been  focused  extensively  not  on  integration 
through law (Weiler 1991), but on integration generated by rational actors in the field of law. 
In its ability to shape the European law and the integration process the European Court of 
Justice has become the object of several analyses which characterize it as a powerful rational 
actor, able to shape the European law and the integration process by its “judicial activism.” “The 
Court of Justice is also a strategic rational actor” (Garrett 1995: 173) Geoffrey Garrett notes in an 
early study, and he is not alone in this appraisal. The concept of rationality and the rational actor 
model – which occupies a central position in scientific studies – became the primary explanation 
for the integration fostered by the ECJ’s judicial lawmaking. Astonishingly, at this juncture, one 
encounters  almost  unanimous  agreement  among  the  different  theoretical  approaches  to  the 
concept  of  rationality.  While  the  various  integration  theories  and  schools  of  thought  –  from 
neofunctionalism, through neorationalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, to supranationalism 
–  offer  an  abundance  of  explanatory  patterns,  all  are  based  on  a  generalizing,  linear  and 
mechanistic understanding of rationality. But is it tenable to explain the momentum of European 
law and the work of the ECJ simply by reference to a universal concept of rationality that was 
originally designed to explain political processes and the reasoning of political actors? Is law, 
understood as a social institution, actually only a mere pawn of rational actors’ interests? Or is it 
rather that law constitutes a dimension of genuine legal rationality, a self-propelling momentum 
that shapes Europe’s developing legal sphere? 
This  article  will  show  that  the  logics  of  law  and  judicial  lawmaking  are  based  on  a 
different kind of rationality than has been employed in diverse studies so far. The universalistic  
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and inflexible notion of rationality – that seems to work in parts of the political sphere rather than 
in the legal one – has been uncritically used to explain integration through law, and leads to 
serious misinterpretations about the role the ECJ can and must take in the course of integration. 
What is even worse is that, by assuming the ECJ could develop the law according some kind of 
political rationality or self-interested aim, these approaches call into question the legitimacy of 
the integration process as a whole. 
As an alternative to the rationalist and actor-centered view of integration, I propose the 
concept of context rationality, which I outline by critically debating the contemporary research 
and continuing controversies generated by different rationalist theorists. My thesis proposes that 
there is not just one kind of rationality, but a multitude of rationalities that are dependent on 
certain social contexts. European law today constitutes such a context, and it should be perceived 
as a self-contained sphere of action and thought that self-generates the impetus for integration. 
Therefore, the role of the ECJ in the course of integration through law may only be adequately 
understood by examining the idiosyncrasies and rules of the law, i.e. the rationality of the law as 
an independent space of meaning and reasoning. 
This article offers context rationality as an analytical tool for explaining legal integration 
in Europe. The article does not aim to justify the ECJ’s judgments wholesale. Rather, the intent is 
to  use  context  rationality  to  pave  the  way  for  overcoming  the  deadlocked  and  long-lasting 
scientific debates on the political role of the Court, which result in incomplete and inaccurate 
views of the role the Court plays in the integration process. 
First,  I  will  show  that  the  different  approaches  towards  European  integration  share  a 
common  understanding  of  reason  and  action  in  the  legal  sphere,  an  understanding  that  was 
originally invented to explain politically motivated integration processes. I will trace how the 
grand theories of European integration in circulation since the early 1990s have been transferred 
to legal integration, and still affect the current discussions about the ECJ. Second, the theoretical 
concept of context rationality will be outlined by considering insights from the “Interpretive 
Sociology” of Max Weber, and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s works on the philosophy of language. In 
doing  so,  I  intend  to  develop  a  novel  approach  that  is  critical  toward  a  universalistic 
understanding of rationality. Finally, I will show how this approach can be used to develop a 
better understanding of the process of legal integration in the European Union.  
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2.  The “rational politics” of legal integration 
Since the early works of Hjalte Rasmussen (1986, 1988) and Joseph Weiler (1991, 1993, 
1994), European law as a factor of integration has increasingly moved into the focus of political 
science  research.  Today,  European  law  is  no  longer  perceived  as  mere  texts  written  in 
“constitutional  treaties:”  it  is  supposed  to  be  an  instrument  for  facilitating  and  advancing 
European unification. Accordingly, the law is understood to constitute a new and distinct political 
arena in which a variety of groups of actors – from private national litigants, to nation states, to 
the  genuine  European  institutions  –  are  trying  to  exert  their  influence  and  implement  their 
interests (e.g. Granger 2006). The ECJ, being Europe’s highest court and therefore in a powerful 
position, is assumed to play a key role in this arena. Its influential judicial development of law 
case by case consistently had crucial effects on the integration process and became the subject of 
numerous analysis and critiques (e.g. see Burley/Mattli 1993, 1998; Alter 1996, 1998, 2000, 
2001, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c; Conant 2002; Garrett/Keleman/Schulz 1998; Heisenberg/Richmond 
2002; Höpner 2008, 2010; Hunt 2007; Kilroy 1999; Moravcsik 1995; Pollack 1997; Rasmussen 
1986; Slaughter/Stone Sweet/Weiler 1998; Stone Sweet 1999, 2004, 2005; Scharpf 1999, 2006; 
Schepel/Blankenburg 2001; for an overview see also Conant 2007; Schepel 2000). 
However,  although  all  these  approaches  seem  to  offer  different  explanations,  they  all 
share  a  short  and  simple  assumption  that  has  led  to  considerable  misapprehensions:  that  the 
European  Court  of  Justice  is  a  rational  and  political  actor.  Although  this  finding  seems 
convincing  at  first  sight,  it  contains  many  unanswered  questions  and  implies  some  severe, 
unsolvable problems. To show how these questions and problems are interrelated, I will start with 
a short overview of some of the most popular and influential schools of thought in European 
integration theory, and the way they incorporate the ECJ and its position. This retrospective 
should be especially interesting, because more recent studies have continuously referred to the 
popular  assumptions  outlined  by  these  theoretical  frameworks.  I  will  begin  by  discussing 
neorationalist,  liberal  intergovernmentalist,  neofunctionalist  and  supranationalist  scholars,  and 
how these have tried to explain the integration happening in the legal sphere. After that, I will 
take  into  account  how  some  more  recent  works  have  uncritically  adopted  some  central 
suppositions and fundamental beliefs from these theories. I will show that assuming the ECJ is a 
political and rational actor is a misinterpretation of the rule of European law, and casts doubt on  
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the legitimacy of the whole integration project. I will argue that the conception of the ECJ used 
so far in the theories and studies of European integration is not able to draw a convincing picture 
of integration through law. The aim, from this vantage point, will be to offer a more convincing 
explanation for  legal  integration  and  to  allow  concrete  predictions  for  the  process  of  further 
integration. 
Neorationalism 
An early study from a neorationalist point of view was proposed by Geoffrey Garrett et al. 
(Garrett 1992, 1995; Garrett/Keleman/Schulz 1998). The explanatory strategy of neorationalists 
has been to show convergence in the interests of different groups of actors in judicial lawmaking. 
Basically, Garrett et al. had to solve the question of why the nation states have been willing to let 
the  ECJ  impair  their  sovereignty,  although  this  obviously  contradicts  their  vital  interest  in 
safeguarding their autonomy and latitude of political action. Garrett argues that, contrary to its 
appearance, progressive case law is quite in line with the interest of the nation states for two 
reasons: 
First, the states find themselves in the following, fundamental economic dilemma, well 
known in rational choice theory as the free-rider problem: adherence to the common rules of the 
community is the preference of every member state; otherwise, the effectiveness of European law 
and all its advantages is endangered. At the same time, however, states strive to maximize their 
own benefits and tend to defect when they do not have to fear sanctions. One way of overcoming 
this dilemma, could be to establish a common legal framework that is safeguarded by a neutral 
institution (in this case the European Court of Justice), which guarantees general compliance with 
the acquis communautaire.  
Second, the EU treaties and secondary law need to be interpreted, since the member states 
that  originate  these  legislative  acts  are  simply  not  able  to  anticipate  all  the  cases  and 
developments that may occur in the future. For that task, the states have to accept a common 
adjudication body that is able to decide from case to case how the law is to be interpreted. The 
ECJ performs this function of application and completion of the law for the EU (cf. Garrett 1992: 
557).   
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In either case, members participating in a community adjudicated by the ECJ can expect 
more benefits than those who do not participate in institutionalized cooperation (cf. Garrett 1995: 
172). States are therefore acting rationally when they accept the rule of law and the ECJ, as long 
as the benefits overweigh the disadvantages: “The benefits of accepting a decision are a function 
of the magnitude of the country’s economic gains from the internal market. Where the broader 
benefits a government derives from having an effective legal system underpinning the internal 
market outweigh the specific domestic costs associated with the court’s ruling in a given case, the 
government’s rational strategy will be to accept the decision” (Garrett 1995: 172). 
From  this  perspective,  rationality  in  law  and  other  fields  of  action  is  calculable, 
predictable,  and  reduced  to  something  that  advances  somebody’s  interest.  In  a  neorationalist 
perspective it follows to suppose that: “The Court of Justice is also a strategic rational actor” 
(Garrett 1995: 173). Thus, “the justices’ primary objective is to extend the ambit of European law 
and their authority to interpret it. […] From the court’s perspective, the best decisions are those 
that both expand European law and enhance the court’s reputation for constraining powerful 
member governments” (Garrett 1995: 173). To make sure that its own legal decision-making and 
position of power is not contested, the ECJ – if it acts wisely – therefore has to foresee the 
reactions of the member states, to make sure a boycott does not undermine its authority and 
future influence. The Court has to keep the reactions of its opponents in mind and will only rule 
against national governments in cases where it can be sure that these will ultimately accept the 
decision (Garrett 1995: 181). The neorationalist perspective paints a picture of a court that is little 
more than a “constitutional court,” dependent on the rational interests and willingness of the 
member  states  to  comply  with  certain  decisions.  The  law  here  again  is,  and  can  only  be,  a 
dependent variable of the participating actors’ interests. 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
The liberal intergovernmentalist approach put forth by Andrew Moravcsik bears some 
essential  resemblances  to  the  neorationalist  framework  of  analysis.  It  doubts  the  true  and 
independent autonomy of the Court, and views supranational decision-making as the last step of a 
process that can only originate in the nation states. In the state, preferences are formed in a 
pluralistic process in which governmental officials and other political actors are pressured by 
domestic  societal  actors  and  the  groups  they  form  to  enforce  their  interests.  After  national  
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preferences have been established, these will be stated and negotiated by the government on the 
supranational level (Moravcsik 1993: 480 ff.). In this approach, the presence of the ECJ must be 
understood as an attempt of “pooling” sovereignty on the supranational level (cf. Moravcsik 
1993: 482, 1995: 612, 622 ff.). This kind of “merging” of state competences, indeed, is not much 
more than a summary of foreign political preferences and the interests of all the member states 
(see also Grimmel/Jakobeit 2009: 192 ff.). In other words, what is delegated to the ECJ is not the 
authority to act in trust for the long-term interests of the community of European states, but the 
task of providing certain benefits that lie in the short-sighted interest of individual states and their 
governments. “Pooling,” in a liberal intergovernmentalist understanding, means that the ECJ is 
perceived as just a repository of national interests: neither the law, nor the work of the ECJ is 
understood as genuinely European. So national support for the European law will come to an end 
on the same day that it is no longer in the best interests of the states’ officials: “Governments 
delegate or tolerate the delegations of authority in order to achieve the benefits of an entire 
stream of decisions interlinked by delegation” (Moravcsik 1995: 622). 
The  role  of  the  ECJ  in  the  liberal  intergovernmentalist  theory  can  be  described  as  a 
servant of national interests, not as a servant of the law. The Court has to live with the persistent 
fear of being overruled or even suspended by the states and their governments if its adjudication 
does not match the aggregated interests of the member states. In this case, it seems astonishing 
that the states have borne the interference of the European judges, and what is characterized by 
Moravcsik  as  “radical  judicial  activism.”  As  an  explanation  for  this  “judicial  anomaly” 
(Moravcsik 1995: 623), Moravcsik suggests that the states see themselves faced with a dilemma 
they cannot escape. For him, the main reason why they have been willing to accept the activism 
of the ECJ and its judges – and here he seems to turn Garrett’s argumentation upside-down – lies 
in the enormous follow-up costs that the governments have to face if they do not comply with the 
ECJ-judgments every time. “[N]on-compliance in a single case of the ECJ implicitly calls into 
question the enforcement of other EU laws” (Moravcsik 1995: 623; cf. id. 1995: 178; see also 
Sander 1998: 70 ff.). In case of an open rebellion against a certain judgment, the rule of the whole 
body of EU-law would be in doubt, because every state could begin to refuse decisions that are 
not in its direct interests, according to Moravcsik. 
In  liberal  intergovernmentalism  the  European  Court  and  the  nation  states  are  rational 
actors, though their preferences and their abilities to enforce their interests vary. The Court can  
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wield its influence and power only to the extent that nation states are willing to accept this. The 
agent is still accountable to the principal in this framework of analysis: he, as well as the law, is 
dependent upon the rationally calculated will and ongoing acceptance of other, political actors. 
Neofunctionalism 
Although neofunctionalism offers a distinct explanatory pattern and also arrives at another 
conclusion,  it  is  based  on  the  same  generalizing  and  linear  understanding  of  rationality,  and 
implies a similar model of the law’s role in the process European integration. The most important 
difference  is  that  neofunctionalism,  unlike  neorationalism  and  liberal  intergovernmentalism, 
emphasizes another group of actors in the field of law and lawmaking on the European level. In a 
neofunctionalist perspective like that of Burley/Mattli and Alter in early years, it is not nation 
states, but the actors below and above the level of national governments that are assumed to 
crucially influence the progress of integration; in particular, the European Court (its judges and 
advocates general), the Commission, national courts, and private litigants (cf. Burley/Mattli 1993: 
58 ff.; see also Alter 1998). Due to this focus, neofunctionalism provides a different explication 
of the decisive factors in the ongoing legal integration of Europe. Integration in and by law here 
is perceived as a classical spillover process, propelled by supranational and subnational elites 
driven  by  their  self-interests  into  an  ever-closer  union  (cf.  de  Búrca  2005:  312).  There  is 
agreement among neofunctionalism, neorationalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, however, 
in  how  the  actors  are  characterized:  “The  glue  that  binds  this  community  of  supra-  and 
subnational actors is self-interest” (Burley/Mattli 1993: 60), and not an interest in the rule of law, 
or a belief in the values upon which the European community rests. In this regard, the ECJ and 
subnational actors do not differ from their opponents in the national governments.  
The  sole  difference  between  sub-national  and  supranational  actors,  on  one  hand,  and 
governments and other national officials, on the other, is their self-interest in European law and 
their abilities to enforce their wills. The actors emphasized by neofunctionalism are described as 
being in a better position of power, and therefore have been able to circumvent the national 
governments  and  expand  their  influence  in  the  political  sphere.  The  preliminary  ruling 
mechanism (Art. 267 TFEU)
1 has been especially emphasized by neofunctionalists as placing the 
ECJ  in  a  position  to  legally  circumvent  the  states’  authority  (see  Alter  1996,  1998;  cf. 
                                                            
1 ex. Art. 234 EC Treaty  
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Carrubba/Murrah  2005).  Though  the  nation  states  try  to  slow  down  the  process  of  legal 
integration to safeguard their political maneuvering room and to preserve their autonomy, the 
“concatenation  of  interests  above  and  below  the  state  gave  a  self-sustaining  impetus  to  the 
process of integration” (Burley/Mattli 1998: 180 ff.). It is obvious that in this process of the 
struggle for influence, there is not much space left for either the law itself, or legal reason. This 
gets very clear in the explanation offered by Burley/Mattli: “[L]aw functions both as mask and 
shield. It hides and protects objectives in the purely political sphere. […] Law can only perform 
this  dual  political  function  to  the  extent  it  is  accepted  as  law.  A  ‘legal’  decision  that  is 
transparently ‘political’, in the sense that it departs too far from the principles and methods of the 
law, will invite direct political attack. It will thus fail both as mask and shield” (Burley/Mattli 
1993: 73). 
This  is  a  remarkable  thesis  that  implicitly  relies  on  the  “language  and  logic  of  law” 
(Burley/Mattli 1993: 44) and the common bonds of European law. To fulfil these two functions 
(1. as a mask, and 2. as a shield), the law must already be acknowledged as a simultaneously 
independent and binding context.  
1.  The law as mask: The recognition of the rule of law is reflected in the fact that the 
true  motives  behind legal  reasoning  always  have  to  be  covered  by a  mask  of  legalese.  This 
means, for example, that the ECJ cannot justify its ruling with an interest in “prestige and power” 
(Burley/Mattli 1993: 64), but has to find legal arguments to make its decisions acceptable to 
others, especially the state governments. The latter then cannot rebel against the Court, because it 
has camouflaged its true reasons: “The courts’ effectiveness in advancing its own agenda thus 
depends on how convincingly it speaks as the technical and apparently non-political voice of ‘the 
law’” (Mattli/Slaughter 1995: 185 ff.).  
2.  The law as shield: As far as the Court uses legal arguments, all opponents of its ruling 
are forced to do the same in the legal domain. The critics of the ECJ therefore have to use the 
language and logic of law to counter the judges’ claims. Although a state might have economic or 
political interests in a certain case, it might not be able to argue convincingly by referencing these 
interests: “… overt political arguments are illegitimate” (Mattli/Slaughter 1998: 196). The law 
imposes certain rules in the legal game that shield it from criticism.  
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In Neofunctionalism the law can be used or misused by actors, (and this goes beyond the 
neorationalist and liberal intergovernmental approaches), in order to camouflage the ECJ judges’ 
true interests behind a veil of legalese. The great advantage the ECJ has in this game, however, is 
the fact that it is in the position of interpreting the law and therefore is able to decide which 
arguments are legitimate and which not. Thus, it is not the law, but the will of the Court that rules 
the decision-making: the language and logic of law are only a pretense (see also de Búrca 2005: 
316 ff.). 
Supranational Governance 
In a more recent theoretical approach developed by Alec Stone Sweet et al., the ECJ and 
the EU law are characterized as part of a broader supranational governance structure. In this 
context  Stone  Sweet  distinguishes  between  dyad  (as  a  direct  exchange  pattern  between  two 
disputants) and triad (an indirect exchange pattern with two disputants and a dispute resolver 
body) constellations (cf. Stone Sweet 1999: 148 ff.). The core of a governance perspective is seen 
in the latter, the “triadic dispute resolution.” The precondition for the development of such an 
institution  is  the  existence  of  a  normative  structure,  i.e.  patterns  of  behavior  that  have  been 
consolidated over time and that are the precondition for any social interaction. At the same time, 
“[b]ehaviour  that  responds  to  these  opportunities,  once  locked  in  (e.g.,  in  dyadic  forms), 
reinforces  normative  structure”  (Stone  Sweet  1999:  151).  Transferred  to  the  European  legal 
system and the Court of Justice this means: “Once fixed in a given domain, European rules – 
such as relevant treaty provisions, secondary legislation, and the European Court of Justice’s case 
law – generate a self-sustaining dynamic that leads to the gradual deepening of integration in that 
sector and, not uncommonly, to spillover into other sectors” (Stone Sweet/Sandholtz 1997: 299).  
To  generate  and  uphold  this  self-sustaining  dynamic,  it  is  necessary  for  all  involved 
parties (national interest groups, member states and their governments, private litigants and their 
advocates, and also national and supranational judges), to share a continuing interest in the triad 
institution. The value of an institution like the ECJ, therefore, is dependent on the benefit that 
actors expect from it.  
In this supranationalist framework rationality also plays a key role: “People are rational in 
the sense of being purposeful and goal-orientated” (Stone Sweet 2004: 5), and “…all legal actors  
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are instrumentally rational, in the sense of generally pursuing their own individual or corporate 
interests,  however  defined”  (Stone  Sweet  2004:  37).  Stone  Sweet  and  Brunell  see  the  main 
benefit of an adjudication body as the cost-reducing function it pursues (cf. Stone Sweet/Brunell 
1998: 64). The ECJ performs this function to the extent that it produces common rules “that serve 
to reduce the transaction costs, enhance the legal certainty, and stabilize the expectations of those 
engaged in or contemplating exchange” (Stone Sweet/Brunell 1998: 64). By doing so, the Court 
can be seen as the agent of the member states. 
On the other side, the ECJ also plays an active role in this process, which directly emerges 
from the preferences of the Court and the interests of the judges (cf. Stone Sweet 2005: 39). What 
are  these  preferences?  The  answer  Stone  Sweet  proposes  reminds  us  of  the  neofunctionalist 
approach and the concept of law as mask and shield (see above): “Judges, I expect, will seek to 
maximize, in addition to their own private interests, at least two corporate values. First, they will 
seek  to  enhance  their  legitimacy,  vis-à-vis  all  potential  disputants,  by  portraying  their  own 
rulemaking as meaningfully constrained by, and reflecting the current state of, the law. Second, 
they will work to strengthen the salience of judicial modes of reasoning vis-à-vis disputes that 
may  arise  in  the  future.  Propagating  argumentation  frameworks  allows  them  to  pursue  both 
interests simultaneously” (Stone Sweet 2004: 37).  
Hence, the law in itself is, in the analysis of the supranational approach, subsequent to the 
partly private and partly institutional interests of different actors. Hence, it is not the rule of law 
that  governs  the  EU,  but  the  interests  behind  the  law.  The  common  European  law  is  not 
developing in compliance with common judicial claims or legitimate forms of argumentation, it 
is only superficially characterized by these. In the understanding of Stone Sweet, the law is just a 
dramatic performance on the grand stage of the ECJ.  
Recent Studies and Critiques 
All these “classical” rationalist studies and theoretical texts on integration through law 
had and still have a great impact on the perception of the European Court and its work. Mainly 
based on the rationalist explanations offered in the early stages of European integration, it has 
become a general opinion that the ECJ has ambitious and self-interested aims in policy-making 
and shaping the course of integration. This belief has led to some severe criticism, not only in  
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political science, but also in public, political discussions about the future of Europe. Among 
others, the former German president and president of the federal constitutional court, Roman 
Herzog,  has  sharply  criticized  the  ECJ.  In  an  article  published  in  one  of  Germanys  largest 
newspapers entitled “Stop the European Court of Justice: Competences of Member States Are 
Being Undermined – The Increasingly Questionable Judgments from Luxemburg Suggest a Need 
for a Judicial Watchdog” (Herzog/Gerken 2008), Herzog intervened against the decisions made 
in Luxembourg. He argued that the ECJ was created as a mere “arbitrator to mediate in the 
interests  of  the  EU  and  those  of  the  Member  States,”  yet  now  “the  ECJ  undermines  the 
competences of the Member States even in the core fields of national powers” (ibid: 5). This dark 
appraisal of the Court’s work was abetted by the several political science analysis published in 
the last years that share the presumption of a politically motivated, rational acting, and interest-
driven Court of Justice:  
In two recent studies, Höpner concludes that now it seems to be an acknowledged fact in 
law,  political  science,  and  sociology  that  the  European  Court,  by  expanding  “European  law 
extensively … has become an ‘engine of integration’” (Höpner 2010: 3). It is practicing judicial 
activism  and  is  leading  the  EU  to  an  ever-closer  union in  law  without  being  democratically 
authorized to do so. Under the title “Usurpation Instead of Delegation” (2008), Höpner tries to 
show  how  the  ECJ  has  “radicalized”  the  integration  of  the  common  market.  Drawing  on 
neorationalist,  liberal  intergovernmentalist,  and  neofunctionalist  theoretical  assumptions  (see 
above), he claims that: (1.) the ECJ takes advantage of different time horizons strategically, (2.) 
the Court is able and willing to profit from the high costs of coordination within and between 
member states, from (3.) the inability of politics to react on judicial activism, and from (4.) the 
heterogeneous interests of those who are affected by its judgments (Höpner 2008: 26 ff.; cf. 
Höpner 2010).  
Scharpf is very critical of the “Court’s power of judicial legislation” (Scharpf 2006: 852). 
For him, there seems to be no doubt that the European Court is a political actor, or is at least 
“able to exercise policy-making functions” (ibid: 851). Even worse is the fact that the ECJ’s 
political interests are based on some kind of “‘liberal’ program of liberalization and deregulation” 
that “may presently be undermining the ‘republican’ bases of member-state legitimacy” (Scharpf 
2009: 245). In Scharpf’s view, the decision-making of the Court is illegitimate because it is  
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perceived to be political, obviously motivated by interests that enhance the erosion of the nation 
state and its core competences. 
Alter, drawing on neofunctionalist and historical institutionalist insights, also shares the 
central assumptions offered by the rationalist “classics” of integration theory. In several studies 
the  ECJ  is  characterized  as  a  “political  actor  in  Europe”  (Alter  2009a:  5),  equipped  with 
significant “political power” (2009c: 287) and marked by the will “to expand its own authority” 
(2000: 513). In “aggressively interpreting and enforcing ECSC rules” (2009a: 8) and expanding 
the European law into the national legal systems “… the ECJ has been so exceptional” (2009c: 
289). Also, Alter shares the view of the judicial activism and strategic rational behavior the ECJ 
used to enforce its interests: The “ECJ used legal lacunae to seize new powers and delve into 
areas that member states considered to be their own exclusive realm” (Alter 2000: 513), and 
“numerous cases have allowed the ECJ to develop EU law incrementally, a strategy that has been 
important in building support for its jurisprudence and enhancing the effectiveness of the EU 
legal system” (ibid: 516). 
Josselin/Marciano also employ the rationalist assumptions and highlight the principal-
agent-relationship between the Court and the EU member states by trying to show “how a legal 
agent  undertook  actions  and  made  decisions  with  political  consequences”  (Josselin/Marciano 
2007: 72). In their framework of analysis, as in the earlier theoretical approaches, European law 
is perceived to be far from independent and accepted as an institution possessing intrinsic value. 
It is dependent on the ECJ’s “right to go beyond the interpretation and enforcement of existing 
rules  [which]  necessarily  leads  to  a  kind  of  irreversible  shift  of  power  from  the  (political) 
principal to the (legal) agent” (ibid: 72).  
Kenney focuses on the ECJ and its power position vis-a-vis other actors in the EU to 
explore the “‘activist’ nature of the court and the ‘juridical’ nature of politics.” In her conclusion, 
in  accordance  with  the  mainstream  of  rationalist  integration  theories,  the  “ECJ  has  used  its 
judicial power to promote greater European integration” and by doing so “expanded its own 
power and transferred power to national courts at the expense of member states” (Kenney 2000: 
597). 
But it is not just theoretical debates that are still influenced by the uncritical acceptance of 
rationalist  theoretical  assumptions.  Recent  empirical  studies,  like  the  one  by  
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Carrubba/Gabel/Hankla (2008), are also centered on the “strategic behavior by judges in the face 
of political constraints” (ibid: 449). These do not even consider that there could be more than just 
strategy  and  rational  interest  enforcement  behind  integration  through  law  in  Europe,  merely 
providing  evidence  or  counter-evidence  for  rationalist  assumptions.  The  law  as  a  factor  of 
integration, interestingly, is still excluded from these studies and, therefore, is not taken into 
account as an intervening variable (cf. also Stone Sweet/Brunell 1998). 
Conclusion 
The major theoretical debate on the role of the European Court of Justice started in the 
1990s,  when  neorationalist  and  neofunctionalist,  and  later,  liberal  intergovernmentalist  and 
supranationalist scholars recognized that such a debate was overdue given the growing influence 
of the Court in the previous decades. The need for discussion also stemmed from the fact that 
integration theorists had not yet tried to develop an approach to explain the rising influence that 
judge-made law had on the building of the European Community. The existing “grand theories” 
that had already been invented and broadly tested in political science suggested themselves as 
explanations (for an overview cf. Grimmel/Jakobeit 2009). These, however, had been primarily 
invented  to  explain  integration  implemented  in  the  political  arena  and  advanced  by  political 
actors and, without doubt, had been quite successful in making the European integration process 
understandable. On this basis, it seemed only natural to incorporate the ECJ into these theories. 
As a matter of fact, the Court was widely perceived to be just one more supranational political 
actor – like the commission or the parliament – steadily advocating for deeper integration (cf. 
Alter 2009b: 44). It was assumed that the ECJ, too, would engage in pro-federalist politics (see 
also Josselin/Marciano 2007) by way of judicial lawmaking, at the same time as it was being 
confronted with the nation states trying to keep and preserve their influence on the European 
level. And indeed, it looked like the Court was quite successful in expanding and implementing 
the supranational European law into the national legal systems of the European states. 
At this point, it is mainly the intergovernmental skeptics of an ever-closer union who see 
themselves confronted with a difficult and puzzling set of questions that could not easily be 
solved  within  their  theoretical  framework:  how  can  the  continuing  transfer  of  sovereignty 
towards  the  European  level,  which  was  enormously  accelerated  by  the  extensive  legal 
interpretations of the ECJ, be explained? Why have the nation states accepted this erosion of their  
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sovereignty and control, when they are still supposed to pull the strings of integration? Why did 
the  principal  let  the  agent  take  over  the  task  of  development  in  law?  Why  did  the  national 
governments not develop the supranational law by themselves, and let the Court occupy parts of 
their legislative reliability?  
The short answer to these pivotal questions has been unanimously proposed by integration 
theory, and has become a popular and widely uncontested belief: the nation states and the ECJ are 
rational actors and the development of the EU-law case by case so far has obviously been in the 
rational interest of all involved parties. Ergo, the judicially-driven expansion of European law 
into the states and their legal orders is a rational decision that is therefore, and only therefore, 
politically  acceptable.  But  what  does  this  exactly  mean?  Which  kind  of  rationality  can  be 
ascribed to a court, an institution that consists of twenty-seven judges who come from different 
European  countries  with  distinct  legal  traditions,  all  trained  in  their  national  laws  and  legal 
traditions  for  many  years,  and  now  sitting  in  different  constellations  in  the  eight  different 
chambers  of  the  ECJ?  Did  these  judges  change  their  personalities  the  day  they  moved  to 
Luxembourg  so  that  they  now  reflexively  exercise  European  “judicial  activism”  instead  of 
considering the interests of their individual nations? Or does the ECJ as an institution make the 
difference, changing the attitudes judges have towards law and legal reasoning? Do the member 
states  and  the  supranational  Court  actually  share  the  same  rationality  and  converge  in  their 
rational interests? Is the difference, after all, only one of perspective, a result of the actors’ point 
of view, whether national or supranational?  
All these open questions call for a deeper understanding of what is going on in Europe’s 
legal sphere, yet they have largely been ignored in recent studies. Instead, the notion of the 
European Court of Justice as a political and rational actor has become an accepted assessment (cf. 
also  Höpner  2010:  3).  Against  this  background,  it  is  no  surprise  that  the  ECJ  has  provoked 
criticism: an arising European legal order that is shaped by a judiciary more concerned with 
“legal politics” (cf. Conant 2007), which follows some kind of diffuse, cost-benefit-rationality 
instead of feeling bound to develop common and just law by drawing on the European legal 
traditions and values, could never result in a democratic and truly lawful Europe. Such a legal 
order, created by various political and rational actors strategically trying to enforce their own 
private interests, can lead to just one disappointing conclusion: the European legal system can 
never be what it is supposed to be: a common legal order and the basis of European Unification.  
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Instead,  it  is  built  on  a  false  foundation  that  will  sooner  or  later  plunge  the  EU  into  crisis. 
Interest-driven, judge-made law will penetrate and replace more and more parts of the national 
legal  orders  without  being  subject  to  any  democratic  control  that  could  be  the  basis  for  its 
legitimacy.  After  all,  the  law  would  lose  the  connection  to  those  whom  it  concerns  –  the 
European people – and would lead to the collapse of the European project. 
What becomes clear in this brief abstract of explanations offered by political science, is 
the great ambivalence with which legal integration is perceived in Europe. On the one side, there 
is  a  growing  interest  in  the  connection  between  law  and  integration.  On  the  other  side,  a 
fundamental  skepticism  prevails  when  thinking  about  an  ever-closer  “community  of  law” 
(Nicolaysen 2002), partly designed by steady judicial development. Although judge-made law or 
judicial development by case law is a well-known task of high courts in the states, it causes 
mistrust on the European level and is disqualified on the basis of being a political act. European 
law  still  seems  to  be  perceived  as  less  legitimate  than  national  law.  The  reason  for  these 
reservations, I will argue in the following part, is to be seen in a certain conception of rationality 
that predetermines this conclusion, but should re-thought and rejected by political theorists. 
3.  The legacy of “trivial rationalism” 
The differences in the theories of European integration seem to be fundamental at first. 
However, all these theoretical approaches converge on a crucial point: they share a generalized 
concept of rationality and use it as a central explanatory factor. Rationality, in these theories, is 
characterized to be a timeless, universal constant, independent of an actor or the structure in 
which it is embedded. Consequently, it is inevitable that the integration through law is perceived 
as a dependent variable of various actors’ interests and their rational actions. Or put another way, 
rationality  persists  as  a  kind  of  formula  or  mechanism,  although  the  actors  preoccupied  by 
rationality change. This means that, in the same position, every actor would behave just like his 
counterpart – the national politician as well as the supranational lawyer. This notion of rationality 
possesses all the features of what Heinz von Foerster once described as a trivial machine: “A 
trivial machine is characterized by a one-to-one relationship between its ‘input’ (stimulus, cause) 
and  its  ‘output’  (response,  effect).  This  invariable  relationship  is  ‘the  machine’.  Since  this 
relationship is determined once and for all, this is a deterministic system; and since an output  
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once observed for a given input will be the same for the same input given later, this is also a 
predictable system” (von Foerster 2003: 208). 
The  conception  of  rationality  that  is  widely  used  in  political  science  and  theories  of 
European integration shares this mechanistic and predetermined input-output-mechanism with 
Von Foersters’ trivial machine, where the relationship between input (stimulus, cause) and output 
(response, effect) is determined “once and for all.” I therefore will call theories relying on such a 
simplistic  understanding  of  rationality  as  “trivial  rationalistic,”  or  the  underlying  theory  of 
rationality “trivial rationalism.” In trivial rationalism different actors, acting in different historical 
contexts and different institutional surroundings, all share the same predetermined rationality. It 
does not matter who is acting or for what reason, the only thing that makes a difference is the 
actor’s interest and the position of power.  
Rationality, in other words, is a linear, non-changeable, and deterministic function that 
connects actor and action. If one can be sure to deal with a rational actor, in as much as one can 
attach  certain  interests  to  this  actor,  every  action  becomes  not  only  explainable,  but  also 
foreseeable for every situation. From that point on, where the interest of a rational actor is known, 
it will become possible to calculate concrete explanations and predictions for every particular 
case. Rationality truly seems to be the marvel of political science. 
 
 
   
 
figure 1: rationality as deterministic system and black box 
 
At the same time, and this should cast serious doubt on trivial rationalism, rationality 
remains an analytical black box. The function of rationality is described only by reference to the 
way it transforms a certain input to a certain output, but the processes happening in the interior 
are not considered as explanatory factors. Rationality seems to be some kind of a magical device 
ACTOR  ACTION  RATIONALITY 
INTEREST  
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that  transforms  every  input  to  a  certain  output  by  a  mechanism  we  could  not  explore. 
Interestingly, we know that there is something like rationality, we can say when an actor acts and 
does not act rationally, but, as per this definition, cannot explain why or how (cf. fig. 1). 
This notion of a generalized and linear rationality is more than dissatisfying. It is the 
central difficulty in contemporary studies of legal integration, clouding the processes happening 
in the interior of Europe’s legal sphere and leading to a grim picture of the ECJ’s role in the 
integration process. In short, in rationalism there is no place for the law as an independent context 
of legal reasoning. It is a mere placeholder of the interest-maximizing minds of political and 
strategic-rational actors. Or as Kenneth Armstrong notes, (trivial) rationalism “… offers us an 
account without law and an account of the ECJ that fails to recognize its function as a court 
within the institution of law” (Armstrong 1998: 158; see also de Búrca 2005; Arnull 2006). 
4.  The context of rationality 
To derive a concept of rationality that is able to incorporate the law as an independent 
variable and that recognizes the ECJ and its function as a court within this context, I want to 
begin with two remarks on the trivial rationalistic model, which will be the foundation of a more 
appropriate and non-trivial notion: 
First, the common use of the term “rationality” seems to imply that there is only one form 
of rationality, or that rationality is something that is necessarily invariable and unchangeable. It 
seems as if rationality is identical to itself all the time, like a mathematical equation
2 or that 
rationality allows no further explanation. Or as Martin Hollis once put it: „Rational action is its 
own explanation” (Hollis 1977: 20 f.). But is it tenable or at least appropriate to subsume the 
manifold  nature  of  human  action  under  just  one  term?  Is  there  not  a  difference  between 
rationality  in  law,  in  politics,  or  in  economics?  Rationality  in  its  singular  form  must  be 
understood as a collective term, and not a concept that can ever describe all the (rational) actions 
people do or did. The works of Max Weber on “Interpretative Sociology” laid out in “Economy 
and Society” (1922) already offer a more convincing means of coping with the complexity that 
lies behind the term. Weber assumed that the modern, functional, differentiated western societies 
had developed several “value spheres”, i.e. distinct contexts of reasoning and action, each having 
                                                            
2 E.g., 1=1 or rationality=rationality.   
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its own socially emerged means and ends: e.g. family, economy, politics, science, law or religion. 
Each of these had a specific kind of logic that determined rational action within its own domain. 
The merit of Weber’s work on value spheres was to have shown that there is not one rationality, 
but a plurality of rationalities, with every one of these having only a limited range within modern 
societies.  
Although one might not agree with Webers’s concrete distinction of value spheres, the 
notion of a rationality that is dependent on a certain context is extremely useful for understanding 
rational  action  in  law,  and  is  convincing  in  considering  the  highly  specified,  craft-bound 
discourses that dominate the functionally differentiated sectors of society. Often these presuppose 
long-lasting studies in the field or discipline related to such a context to even take part in its 
discourse. In today’s highly sophisticated and technocratic “sphere of law,” this especially seems 
to be the case (cf. Münch: 2008). Or, as de Búrca notes: “[L]aw defines the framework and 
context within which political and social actors operate, … it affects and constrains these actions 
and  relations,  …  it  determines  in  part  the  impact  of  political  acts,  and  …  it  conditions  and 
tempers those acts in translating them into everyday application” (de Búrca 2005: 317). In such a 
highly socially, culturally and historically determined context, rationality has to be more than just 
a predetermined transformation of inputs (interests) and outputs (action).  
Second, and directly connected to the former point, trivial rationalism contains a paradox 
that becomes visible from the viewpoint of the philosophy of language. The “language and logic 
of  law”  recognized  by  Burley  and  Mattli  (1993),  as  noted  above,  presupposes  a  common 
understanding and recognition of the law, and also of what counts as “rational” in the field of 
law.  Or,  as  Hollis  put  it:  “It  is  about  knowledge  of  the  rational  thing  to  do  or  the  a  priori 
understanding of necessities to which rational action is subject” (Hollis 1977: 165). Simply said, 
to speak in the language and logic of law, one must first learn to understand and speak this 
language. By doing so, not only are different words for the same things learned, but the whole 
system has to be internalized (law consists of far more than just using the technical terms of legal 
reasoning!). Ludwig Wittgenstein showed very clearly in his later works that “there must be 
agreement not only in definitions but also … in judgments” to make communication possible.“ It 
is one thing to describe  methods of  measurement, and another to obtain and state results of 
measurement. But what we call ‘measuring’ is partly determined by a certain constancy in results 
of measurement” (PI: § 242). The situation is the same with language and the logic of law. The  
-19- 
 
law does not simply lie in the words and phrases of jurisprudence, but in the acceptance of certain 
values and ways of applying these to the world, and to manifold cases in a judicial way (see also 
Dobler 2008: 550 ff.). Speaking the language of law means to confirm and respect the whole 
system of law – a system that could never be shaped by single actors and their private interests, 
but only by all those who effectively “measure” the world in legal terms.  
So, every time actors speak in the language and logic of law – whether they have private 
interests or not – they show their consent with the law and its procedures, its “measurements” and 
“measures.” It is quite simply not possible to speak this language without referring to what all the 
other participants of the legal discourse understand about law and how it has to be applied. To 
speak  the  language  and  logic  of  law  there  must  be  a  common,  not  a  private,  way  of 
understanding, otherwise communication would become impossible. So, if we suppose that the 
treaties, laws, norms, rules and principles in Europe are solely interpreted through a mechanistic 
rationality and in accordance to private interests, we could expect two things to happen: either the 
private interpretation could not be understood by the rest of the legal community, or the meaning 
of law would be adjusted over time and cease to exist in any substantial way. The regular use of 
the law as a function of interests would transform it over time to something else in practice – an 
order of legal arbitration in which the law itself is not more than an empty shell. Although this is 
obviously  still  not  the  case,  it  would  be  the  logical  consequence  of  taking  trivial  rationalist 
predictions seriously.  
To  solve  these  problems,  which  must  remain  unsolvable  within  a  trivial  rationalist 
framework of analysis, I propose to open the black box of rationality, and to look inside of what 
constitutes rational action in law in general, and in Europe’s legal sphere, in particular. To do so, 
a non-trivial analytical concept of rationality has to be conceptualized as a form of reasoning that 
depends on its surroundings, on a certain context, and could therefore called context rationality.
3 
Here, every context is distinguished from other contexts in three ways: (1) The law in Europe has 
to be differentiated from other contexts by the specific legal rules it contains. Law in modern, 
functional, differentiated societies is an autonomous and distinct institution that is specified and 
determined by rules other than political or economic ones. The law constitutes a certain space of 
                                                            
3 On a philosophical consideration of context and rationality, cf. Grimmel, A. 2010. “Where the River meets the Sea: 
Wittgenstein and the Context of Rationality;“ “Die Transformation des Rationalitätsbegriffs in Wittgensteins 
Philosophie der Sprache” (unpublished manuscripts).   
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argument in which non-legal arguments are refused (no litigant would ever argue politically, or 
with reference to certain self-interests in front of a court). Though interests might be a legitimate 
motive for making a claim, the law has strict rules about which arguments are acceptable and 
which are not. (2) A context is a local or cultural space of meaning, defined by the sum of rules 
that  provide  reasons  (not  causes!)  for  action  (cf.  Hollis/Smith  1990:  188).  European  law  is 
distinct from other local legal contexts, such as national or international legal systems, by its own 
genuine  European  rules.  Although  it  is  based  on  national  legal  doctrines  and  procedures, 
European law is a legal system sui generis. (3) The rules that apply in the context of European 
law are not fixed, but variable and subject to change over time. The meaning of law and certain 
legal codifications, like the ones in the “constitutional treaties,” changes steadily. By nature, law 
must  be  adapted  to  the  never-ending  social  change  it  is  confronted  with.  Definitions  and 
judgments in the language and logic of law are in permanent motion. European law, in particular, 
with its unfinished character, is subject to manifold ongoing modifications (cf. fig. 2).   
 
figure 2: the context of rationality 
Within a contextual understanding, rationality; 
-  is able to shape the reasoning of actors, and is, at the same time shaped by action 
-  is a highly dynamic process, steadily changing within its context  
-  is not a predetermined constant, but can be learned, 
-  is not a black box, but can be understood only from an internal viewpoint 
-  is not mechanistic or directly transferrable to other contexts 
-  has a stabilizing and constraining effect on reasoning and action within a certain context 
ACTOR  ACTION  CONTEXT 
RATIONALITY 
(1) functional 
   (2) local  (3) historical  
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To summarize, rationality is embedded in a whole system of meaning, understanding, and 
reasoning within a certain context. This context must be analyzed to make rationality in law 
comprehensible:  the  black  box  of  rationality  has  to  be  opened  and  explored.  In  short,  when 
thinking about integration through law, there is no way around engaging with the law in general, 
and European law in particular.  
5.  The Context Rationality of European law 
Overviewing the dynamics of European law, the role the ECJ played in this context, and 
the methods it used to advance the ambit of the law in many legal cases, there is good reason to 
doubt the notion of a universalistic rationality preoccupying Europe’s legal sphere. European law 
today consists of a broad inventory of norms, methods, rules, and procedures that evolved from 
long legal traditions that originated not only in the nation states, but also in a truly European 
context.  These  are  codified  and  conserved  in  treaties,  or  in  the  directives,  decisions, 
recommendations, and statements of the EU, as well as in case law. Furthermore, there is a 
variety of legal doctrines, methods of legal interpretation, justification, and approved customs; as 
well as patterns of legal reasoning and arguments, which are approved by lawyers and legal 
scholars all over Europe. Already, at first glance, (European) law seems to constitute a distinct 
space of legal rationality. 
This  gets  much  clearer  when  envisioning  that  the  possibility  of  interpreting  and 
developing the law by way of occupying the “language and logics of law,” is dependent on a 
common knowledge and understanding of what law is and has to be about. In other words, within 
the context of law there must be certain preconditions that allow actors to communicate; there 
must  be  some  kind  of  consensus  about  the  rules  of  law  and  legal  reasoning.  To  speak  of 
rationality or rational action in law there has to be at least a minimum of disciplinary consistency 
and coherence within a certain legal context (cf. Ernst 2007: 27; see also Strauch 2000, 2002, 
2005; on coherence in law see Bracker 2000; also cf. Rescher 1973, Coomann 1983). The ECJ 
and other actors have to adjust their actions and reasoning to match these requirements, if their 
claims are supposed to be heard, recognized, understood, and accepted (cf. de Búrca 2005: 317). 
The Court must rely on common European legal traditions so that it will be able to claim that its 
legal  grounds  and  justification  can  be  understood  and  accepted  by  other  actors  in  the  same  
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context. The ECJ can never just announce its judgments and doctrines, but must communicate 
them by reasoning in front of the community of European law. 
This, of course, does not always mean everybody appreciates the legal decisions, or that 
there is never dissent or dispute about the Court’s decision-making. As far as the judgments are 
understandable and do not obviously occupy the rationality of another context (in functional, 
historical or local ways), however, they must count as rational decision, and therefore have to be 
accepted by means of the rationality of the context. In any other case – if, for example, it is 
obvious that political arguments are used or at least underlie the decision – enduring acceptance 
could never be the result. This, however, is the foundation of any successful integration process, 
in law as well as in other contexts. 
The notion of context rationality outlined above goes beyond attributing interests and a 
fixed formula of rationality to actors (in the field of law, tried by Vanberg 1998). Here, rationality 
makes  action  not  calculable,  but  understandable.  It  can  help  us  to  comprehend  integration 
through law instead of sticking to integration generated by rational actors in the field of law. 
European law and its underlying rationality have to be understood and examined in functional, 
local, and historical terms (see fig. 2, above): 
In functional terms, the context of law is distinct from other contexts in the fact that action 
is linked to certain forms of interpretation and argument that are provided by the context, which 
makes it, at the same time, distinguishable from other contexts, such as politics or economics, 
that offer different kinds of reasoning. This has special impact on work with legal texts, because 
these  can  never  be  absolutely  self-enforcing  and  coercive  like  mathematical  or  logical 
propositions: interpretation is always needed. Although politics is also concerned with the same 
subject, the translation and application of legal texts to reality is primarily the task of law and 
jurisprudence. In the European Union, the European Court of Justice “shall ensure that in the 
interpretation  and  application  of  the  Treaties  the  law  is  observed”  (Art.  19  TFEU).  In  this 
function one cannot separate the commonly shared forms of legal argument and interpretation in 
the context of law, but has to follow quite a strict scheme of legal reasoning. Based on Toulmin 
(1958), Alexy (1983, 1992) and Patterson (1996, 2004) the basic scheme for legal assertions and 
legal reasoning can be illustrated in the following way (fig. 3):   
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figure 3: basic scheme of argument in the context of European law 
 
Every judicial argument begins with a claim, like “The national law A in state X is not 
consistent with the law of the EU” or “State Y violates EU law by doing B.” This mere claim, 
however, needs more to be recognized as valid. There must be a ground that gives reason or 
evidence to the claim, such as: “The national law A in state X hinders the free movement of 
goods” or “By doing B State Y violates fundamental rights (e.g. non-discrimination).” Two types 
of criteria can be used to measure the validity of a claim: on the one side, the logical consistency 
must be proved – the conclusion (claim) must result from the premise (grounds for the claim). On 
the other side, the premises and propositions itself must be true and sufficiently justified (cf. 
Bracker  2000:  199).  To  connect  a  claim  with  the  ground  more  is  needed  than  just  logical 
consistency: both claim and ground, have to be connected by a legally codified warrant. Such a 
warrant is needed to answer the question of why and to what extent the ground is relevant to the 
claim. In the European Union these warrants may be seen in primary European law laid down in 
the treaties. But common law, case law, legal traditions, as well as legal acts of secondary law –
like regulations, directives or decisions of the EU – can also be used as warrants (cf. Arndt 2004: 
77 ff.; McCormick 1996: 173).  
In local terms, the rationality of the law is always characterized by particular, culturally 
specific and commonly acknowledged forms  of legal interpretation and practice that make  a 
ground  claim 
warrant 
form of judicial argument/rule of judicial interpretation: 
1. literal/grammatical, 2. historical; 3. systematical; 4. purposive; 5. effet utile  
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certain legal context distinguishable from other legal contexts. Or, as Hollis/Smith once put it: 
“[R]ationality is not a universal capacity for calculating the costs and benefits of actions which 
contribute to an outcome, but the applying of a local rule which supplies reasons for acting” 
(Hollis/Smith 1990: 188). Although in theory, legal texts can be interpreted in many different 
ways, this may not lead to arbitrary interpretation in practice, because otherwise laws would not 
be able to provide legal certainty or any shared meaning (see also Strauch 2000: 1023). There 
have  to  be  commonly  fixed  rules  of  how  to  understand  legal  warrants,  rules  which  define 
legitimate forms of interpretation in law. These forms of judicial argument are – like the warrants 
– dependent on a certain legal context (i.e. by being part of the shared cultural, and therefore 
local,  context  of  law,  they  always  have  a  limited  range  of  application).  The  European  legal 
system has developed its own form of legal reasoning that is distinct from other national or 
international legal orders. It has unique, European patterns of justification and rules of judicial 
interpretation, which connect European law with reality by backing or refuting a claim and its 
premise on the basis of a warrant. In the context of the European Union, the rules of judicial 
interpretation  that  are  canonical  and  commonly  used  to  interpret  the  European  law  are 
literal/grammatical, historical, systematical, purposive and “effet utile” (see also Benoetxea 1993, 
Benoetxea/MacCormick/Moral Soriano 2001, Walter 2009).  
These rules of interpretation make the abstract laws applicable to certain cases and, at the 
same time, transcend the law-interpreting subject by being based on a collective understanding in 
a genuine legal practice (Neumann 2005: 374). To develop an inter-subjective “‘persuasion pull’ 
and ‘compliance pull’” (Weiler 1993: 419) judges cannot merely rely on the power bestowed by 
their institution, but on the forms of legal argument and interpretation that are constitutive of the 
context of law. To emphasize this point, in the context of law it does not matter if a judge has a 
certain attitude towards the case at hand. Though bound to neutrality, judges can never be totally 
free of personal considerations (they are, for example, compelled by their consciences). With 
good cause, the reasons for a judgment are never to demonstrate the integrity or truthfulness of 
the judges, but to make a convincing argument in the context of the law by the means of the law. 
Otherwise, adjudication would not be about the law and its application, but about the moral 
qualities of the human beings in charge of interpreting the law. It goes without saying that this, at 
least in democratic political systems, can and must never be the task of the law or any argument 
in law.  
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Of  course,  this  does  not  preclude  the  possibility  that  judgments  might  be  willfully 
motivated by the judges’ interests, or that individual rulings stretch beyond what is perceived to 
be  appropriate  within  the  borders  of  judiciary  competences.  However,  this  is  not  a  genuine 
European problem, but a general one which is known in the national legal systems as well. It has 
nothing to do with the law itself, but is a violation of the rules of law and thus contestable by the 
means of law. It has to be clear that the rule book of law is not changed because the ECJ from 
time  to  time  tends  to  exceed  the  common  sense  of  legal  justification,  or  is  not  absolutely 
convincing in its reasoning for anyone and in any case. 
The mere fact that interests must be hidden behind a façade of legal expressions and 
arguments, shows the validity of recognizing the law as legitimate form of rationality that must 
not be violated by political arguments. However, if a court regularly employs a political logic and 
camouflages it behind a veil of legal phrases it will inevitably be discovered and challenged, 
since its conclusions (or its “measurements,” to quote Wittgenstein) will obviously not be in line 
with the (European) community of law. As Wittgenstein once put it: “If language is to be a means 
of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also … in judgments” (PI: 
§ 242). 
In historical terms, law and the rationality of law are continuously developed over time. A 
legal context is in constant fluctuation, and never identical to earlier configurations of the same 
functional or local context. The fragmentary and unfinished European law is undoubtedly one of 
the fastest changing legal contexts in the world. This changing character, however, does not 
imply that European law is not based on any tradition or has no foundation. It was not by accident 
that European law was established this way, nor could it have been a purely political decision. 
The European legal order, though comparatively young, could not have been brought into being 
without considering a broad foundation of common legal knowledge and tradition that forms the 
core of the new European legal system. The development of European law case by case must be 
dependent  on  this  nexus  of  prior,  established  law,  and  on  legal  insights  and  doctrines  that 
emerged over decades and centuries. As a matter of fact, the linkage to prior achievements is a 
precondition for the development of judge-made law. The progress of European law has to be 
coherent with the historical framework in which it is embedded, and must be understood as a long 
chain of texts and practices to which the ECJ must remain connected in order to secure the 
understandability and acceptability of its judgments. In this regard Herzog and Gerken are right  
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when they hypothesize: “if the ECJ abuses … confidence, it need not be surprised when it breaks 
down” (Herzog/Gerken 2008: 5). To preserve confidence and to cause the necessary “persuasion 
and compliance pull” in the judicial development of the law, judges can never just create or 
invent law; they must cull it from a common pool of knowledge that defines a rational move in 
the game of law. 
The perspective of context rationality casts a different light on the Court, its role in the 
integration process, and its rationality. Though the ECJ occupies a considerable position of power 
within the institutional structure of the EU, it can never just rely on its assigned role or its “power 
of interpretation” (Alter 2001: 226) to evoke trust, consent and acceptance – all of which are 
undoubtedly the basis for integration. It has to abide by a rationality shared by the people who are 
affected  by  its  judgments.  Rationality  in  this  sense  is  far  more  than  just  a  description  of 
reasonable action, it is a justification for and the foundation of the common acceptability of 
action (cf. Steinvorth 2002: 51), and, at the same time, the precondition for integration. To say 
that the ECJ acts rationally within the borders of the context of law always implies that its action 
is justified, and it could not be criticized as acting illegitimately without violating the law itself. 
So, the only principle judges can rely on to make their judgments convincing, acceptable and, at 
last, enforceable is “truth instead of authority” (Neumann 2005; cf. Dobler 2008). This truth, 
however,  is  not  determined  by  some  kind  of  universal  rationality,  but  can  only  be  one  of 
functional, local, and historical scope. It is precisely due to this point, that fair comment and 
criticism of the Court and integration through law can and must be applied.  
6.  Conclusion 
The interests that have been assigned ex ante or ex post facto to the ECJ and its officials 
have always been and must remain phantasmagorical. Who has ever seen the interest of a judge 
that might have influenced a certain decision? How can the institutional interest of a court be 
measured by science, simply by ascribing a generalized rationality and a set of interests to the 
“players” of the European “integration game?” 
The onus of proof has to be reversed: until it has been proven, we should refuse the claim 
that, behind the façade, the Court is a political actor striving for power and trying to expand 
European law into the national spheres. We cannot judge the judges for the interests we think  
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they might have, or for the non-testable belief in a political judicial activism – at least not in the 
context of science. Arnull is right when he claims: “The allegation of undue activism can only be 
tested by close examination of legal arguments advanced by the Court in support of its decisions” 
(Arnull 2006: 4). So why don’t we simply start to explore the law before we try to understand 
integration through law? Why do we try to impose a simplifying, trivial rational actor model on 
an integration process that is far more complex than just balancing and enforcing interests?  
As an alternative, the perspective of context rationality introduced in this article allows us 
to not only address the underlying interests of an actor’s decisions, but focuses on the shared 
contextual fundamentals of European law. In other words, from this viewpoint, it is not important 
if the ECJ has a political motivation for deciding this or that case in the one or the other way. 
Rather, it is about the potential of mutual agreement on the way the Court arrived at its decision. 
Integration through law does not depend on the fact that the ECJ developed this or that law in a 
certain leading case, but how it developed it, and if it is consistent and coherent with the context 
of European law.  
The theories of European integration so far have just focused on the outputs of legal 
decision-making and by doing so, have completely overlooked the fact that the compliance with 
the law so far is much more than a sign of the mere convergence of actors’ interests. In reality, it 
is  the  core  of  integration  itself  that  surfaces  here,  namely  in  the  possibility  of  mutual 
understanding and reasoning in the European context of law. Only here – and not in some kind of 
trivial  and  predetermined  rationality  –  can  we  find  an  appropriate  explanation  and  a  deeper 
understanding for the process of integration through law. 
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